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Abstract
This paper revisits the issue of the unilateral divorce law, tak-
ing into account that: 1/ the decisions to engage in marriage and
then to divorce or to stay married are fundamentally sequential
decisions; 2/ household consumption has a large joint compo-
nent, generating economies of scale. The unilateral divorce law
is modelled through the combination of exclusive rights on the
marriage dissolution and a monetary transfer to the parent hav-
ing custody of the children. We analyze the influence of alterna-
tive compensation rules both in the short run (probability and
efficiency of divorce) and in the long run (selection of marriages).
We also show that a decrease in the costs of divorce proceed-
ings has by no means commonplace consequences on marriage
ontracting; particularly when consideration of parents’ altruism
and child support is introduced, more marriages are contracted
when the cost of divorces decreases.
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1 Introduction
The economic approach to household formation and marriage dissolution
takes as a starting point the idea that people will engage in marriage
rather than stay single and stay married as long as they feel better off
that way, taking as constraints both the economic and the legal environ-
ment. Thus an important issue arises, which is whether or not divorce
law affects the likelihood of divorce and the frequency of marriage. At a
basic level, divorce law might be important because of the allocation of
rights on marriage dissolution (Becker (1991), Peters (1986)). Thus, a
liberal (unilateral/no-fault) divorce law seems to be more likely to induce
divorce than a legislation requiring mutual consent.
The coasian tradition (Becker, Landes and Michael (1977)) has chal-
lenged this view, arguing that as long as the negotiation is costless and
all payments are feasible between spouses, separation occurs (marriage
continues) as soon as the joint surplus from divorce (respectively, mar-
riage) is higher than from marriage (divorce). Hence, the law on divorce
does not matter. Criticisms of the coasian view have focused on trans-
action costs, indivisibilities or imperfect transferability to explain why
negotiation may fail between spouses. Sources of non transferable utility
come from the production of some specific (quasi-public) assets within
the household, such as children (Becker (1991), Weiss and Willis (1997),
Zelder (1993)) or the existence of large components of joint consumption
such as housing services coming from the family home (Fella, Manzini
and Mariotti (2004)), or imperfect information (Allen and Brinig (2000),
Peters (1986)). This also includes gender differences over lifetime con-
tributions to marriage and childcare (Cohen (1987)) and the existence
of non contractible relationship-specific investments by spouses (Wick-
elgren (2008)). However, the way in which divorce law does matter may
be connected to the very nature of the threat point in the bargaining
process between spouses. Zelder (1993) points out that as long as di-
vorce is the only alternative option to marriage, the divorce is more
likely to occur under the unilateral (no-fault) divorce law, while mutual
consent divorce restores efficiency by thwarting unilateral terminations.
In contrast Fella, Manzini and Mariotti (2004) show that an efficient
marriage may not necessarily survive under a mutual consent divorce
law when each spouse may credibly use the threat to lock the other in
a non-cooperative marriage (perpetual disagreement), a situation which
is worse than either divorce or agreement in marriage.
Interestingly, it has been shown that divorce law also matters in the
absence of any transaction costs, indivisibilities or informational asym-
metries. Clark (1999) gives several examples where the opportunities to
reach a mutually beneficial agreement are less dependent on the alloca-
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tion of dissolution rights than on the allocation of property rights, which
is achieved through the marital property law under mutual consent and
the alimony law under unilateral law. Bowles and Garoupa (2003) show
more specifically that considering the parents’ altruism and the issue of
explicit legal provisions in favour of the children involved in a divorce
introduces difficulties in the implementation of “expectation damages
awards” and an inevitable tension between efficiency in divorces and
efficiency in marriage.
Amain limitation of the controversy is that it focuses on the short run
effects of divorce law, analyzing the opportunity to divorce of married
people1 but ignoring the feedback of divorce law on the initial decision to
enter into marriage. Recently, Mechoulan (2005, 2006) has developed the
hypothesis of the "selection of marriages": a shift to a liberal divorce law
may have different effects on couples depending on whether they married
before or after a legal reform (when unexpected). The argument runs
as follows. On the one hand, since the legal change modifies the odds
of divorce for marriages contracted before a new law is passed, the most
poorly matched among these marriages would be more easily broken,
leading to an increase in the short run divorce rate. In these cases the
key parameter is the new law governing property division and spousal
support. In contrast, for marriages contracted after the legal changes the
key issue is the reallocation of property rights away from the spouse who
does not want tthe marriage to end. Despite the decrease in the cost of a
divorce (since it is easier to get out of in case of poor quality matching),
for such marriages a unilateral divorce law increases the risk of being
confronted to the opportunism of the partner, and thus gives spouses
incentives to increase the quality of matching. This is the dominant
effect in the long run, which explains the decrease in divorces.
Our paper does not consider the issue of the consequences of a change
1Everything goes as if they undertake myopic decisions at each date of their life-
time cycle. The usual motivation for this point of view is well known: the marriage
contract is an incomplete one, since it is not possible to write a detailed program of
actions which may commit the couple to a prescribed behavior in every circumstance
of their marital life (Bergstrom (1996)). This justifies the way that partners in a
marriage evaluate the opportunity to undertake new decisions when needed, thus
engaging in a continuous bargaining process, such that the marriage itself may be
renegociated at any date (Wax (1998)). Nevertheless, this argument is not immune
to the criticism that even if people have incomplete information regarding the future
or if the law forbids them to write complete marriage contracts, it is in their own
interest to take into account all the available information, including the fact that it
may be better, or they may be constrained, to renegotiate in the future. Moreover,
given that in European countries for example, and especially in France, between one
marriage in two (in urban areas) or one marriage in three ends in divorce, candidates
for marriage cannot ignore this issue. Our paper aims to capture this issue.
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in law, but provides a basic extension of the economic analysis of mar-
riage and divorce decisions to a simple two-period game in order to
give some new insights into the issue concerning the short-run and the
long-run (feed-back) consequences of the law on divorces and marriages,
specifically when a divorce law is based on the disconnection between the
allocation of the rights to divorce and the setting of the rules of alimony
or damage awards. In a sense, while criticisms of the coasian views have
focused on the situations where the consensual divorce law yields inef-
ficient divorces (thus it does not do better than the unilateral one), we
investigate when the unilateral law yields efficient divorces2 in the short
run (hence it does as well as a mutual consensual law, since it allows
concealment of the interest of both partners and achievement of implicit
mutual consent), and which are the feedback constraints on potential
partners considering their initial decision to enter into marriage, de-
pending on the property division law. We assume that individuals have
opportunistic behaviors at each date, i.e. they proceed to a basic cost-
benefit analysis in order to choose between marrying or staying alone,
and continuing in marriage or divorcing. The source of non transferabil-
ity which limits the negotiation within the marriage is due to household
expenditures which have a large joint component corresponding to the
existence of fixed costs (child care, housing rent and/or maintenance,
taxes ...) which yield scale economies.
We show that the equilibria arising depend both on the way the
rights on marriage dissolution are held and on the setting of the damage
rule awarded to the parent who has custody of the children. We also
find that any given damage rule may yield multiple equilibria, with ef-
ficient as well as inefficient divorces, depending on the allocation of the
rights on marriage dissolution with which it is associated. The reason is
that when household consumption has a large joint component, divorce
creates an externality (either positive or negative) which is reallocated
through the property division law. Moreover, we show that when the
main issue of the divorce is the furnishing of legal provision for the chil-
dren, the opportunity of mutual benefit in divorce never exists between
altruistic the parents. Regarding the incentives to enter into marriage
initially, we find that these are less dependent on the way the rights on
marriage dissolution are allocated than on the choice of an alimony rule.
In other words, the specific combination of an allocation of rights on
marriage and of the damage awards rule yields different consequences in
terms of marriage selection, with the result of a harsher (participation)
constraint for the parent who will have to bear the externality created by
2By efficient divorce, we mean as in the rest of the literature that the total surplus
in divorce is larger than in marriage.
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the divorce. Finally, we focus on the consequences on marriage contract-
ing of a decrease in the costs associated with the divorce proceedings and
find that these are not commonplace. We find that they are generally
ambiguous, and such a decrease in the cost of divorce may yield more
marriages, especially when children are involved.
Section 2 introduces the basic model. Section 3 considers the issue
of protective measures in favor of children. Finally, section 4 discusses
the scope and limits of our results in the light of some stylized facts.
2 The model
In order to focus on the main issue of the paper, we consider that the
decisions regarding the allocation of time or household expenditures are
exogenously given. This may reflect the existence either of legal con-
straints (income taxes, legal working time) or the influence of social
norms (household production and role of spouses, or ostentatious con-
sumption behaviors). The general story is as follows.
At date 0 (or first period), two adult parties i3 and j decide to stay
alone or to engage in marriage. We assume that individual participation
in the labor market and labor supplies are exogenously set, without loss
of generality. Due to the existence of large amounts of joint consumption,
the parents are supposed to cooperate in marriage, meaning that they
are sharing the surplus of the marriage equally.
At the beginning of date 1 (or second period) the parents contemplate
the opportunity to leave rather than stay in the marriage and continue
to cooperate. There exists an explicit agreement between the parents
concerning the child custody in cases where the parents go on to separate:
if divorce occurs, the children will live with partner j.
In this framework, the law is designed according to two features: first,
it specifies an amount of damages/alimony paid by the leaving parent
to the parent having the child custody; second, the law allocates the
exclusive rights on the marriage (i.e. the full rights to divorce) to one
of the the parents. Hence, such a law allows for a unilateral decision to
divorce. Its main implication is that the law grants the divorce to the
parent as soon as it is in his/her own interest to divorce.
2.1 the timing of decisions
The timing of the game may be stylized according to figure 1, in the
case where the exclusive rights to divorce are granted to partner i.
3Moreover, the at-fault/leaving partner is labelled "he" throughout the paper:
this is not for the sake of concreteness or realism (since the majority of filers in
divorce are women), but once more, only for ease of exposition. But read "she" if
you prefer.
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At date 0, the first node corresponds to the move of i choosing either
to get married (Mi) or stay alone (NMi); at the second node, j chooses
either to accept (Aj) or refuse (Rj) to engage in marriage with i. If j
refuses, the game is over. If j accepts, the game attains the third node.
Depending on the legal alimony, parent i may choose to stay married
(SMi) or get divorced (GDi). At terminal nodes, we have written the
individual outcomes at each date, assuming a constant marginal utility
for both the parents, and the same discounting factor δ ∈ [0, 1] for both.
At date 1 partner i has to decide to stay in the marriage or leave. At
date 0, both the parents have to choose whether to engage in marriage
or stay alone, only knowing the probability of divorce tomorrow.
              Date 0                                   Partner i 
                                              
                                                   NM i                       Mi   
                                                                                       Partner j 
 
                                                                       Aj                       Rj 
             Date 1   
                                                                                            Partner i 
                                                         SMi                      GDi 
 
                            (C0i ; C0 i )           (M0i ; M1 i)    (M0i ; Di)       (C0i ; C0i) 
                            (C0j ; C0 j)            (M0j ; M1 j)    (M0j ; Dj)       (C0j ; C0j) 
 
  
                                                   
FIGURE 1 
2.2 the instantaneous payoffs
In the following, yi, yj will denote individual incomes, while ki, kj, ci, cj, c
will correspond to some positive fixed costs.
If the individuals stay alone at date 0, they will be alone also at date
1. Thus, i obtains as for his instantaneous utility levels:
C0i = yi − ki = C1i at each date
and j obtains:
C0j = yj − kj = C1j at each date
When individuals engage in a cooperative marriage at date 0, they
obtain the same utility level, corresponding to the sharing of the aggre-
gate household income minus expenditures:
6
M0i =M0j =M0 =
yi + yj − c
2
with c > 0 representing for example the children’s consumption. The
second period utility levels associated with the marriage are respectively
defined by:
M1i =M0 =M1j
Conversely, the dissolution of the marriage would give the following in-
dividual utility for the separating partners:
Di = yi −m− ci ; Dj = yj +m− cj
Note that both ci and cj may be understood in a broader sense to encom-
pass for example the parents’ legal expenditures related to the divorce
proceedings, and the monetary equivalents of the psychological penal-
ties/benefits associated with the divorce - as a result of pain, distress
and suffering or in contrast euphoria, recovered optimism and a feel-
ing of freedom. Whether divorce lessens or not the spouses’ feeling of
well-being is a matter of debate, although the parents perceive that di-
vorce hurts their children (see Brinig and Allen (2000) and Gardner and
Oswald (2006)).
The introduction of m also deserves some clarifications. It reflects
that Courts have been led in the long run to adjust their practice regard-
ing the financial aspects of divorce under unilateral divorce legislations4
with a better consideration of human capital (recognizing cases where
one spouse has accepted a sacrifice in terms of education or work op-
portunities to raise children for example) or a better assessment of a
child’s cost. According to this view, it also seems reasonable to consider
that Courts are willing to conceal the the parents’ interest, and choose
4A pure no-fault divorce regime (no-fault for property division) gives rise to op-
portunistic behaviors as it does not tie the property settlement in case of divorce
to the respective investments of spouses in marriage (thus it lowers the cost of a
divorce for the opportunistic spouse). The evolution towards more liberal divorce
laws has been gradual for several countries (See Mechoulan (2005) for the timing of
the different state legislations passed in the USA, and González and Viitanen (2006)
for European countries), and as the shift to no-fault rules for divorce grounds took
place (allowing a spouse divorce candidate to initiate the proceedings without any
proof of marital misconduct) some countries keep on the consideration of fault in the
design of the rules governing the financial part of marriage dissolution. Thus while
some countries have adopted a pure no-fault divorce legislature (no-fault for divorce
grounds, no-fault for property allocation, spouse alimony or child support) others
have introduced no-fault for divorce grounds but still consider marital wrongdoing
in the setting of alimony or "rehabilitative support" awarded to the other spouse.
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a transfer m which limits distortive effects. This is why we focus in the
rest of the paper on the opportunity to choose a m in the set of possible
agreements5. For the moment we treat m as a gross payment without
distinguishing between the recovery of spouse and child support, the
model applies here both to the cases of purely selfish the parents or to
a household without children. In section 3 these different payments will
be disconnected.
2.3 preliminary : incentives to file for divorce
Let us first briefly investigate the basic consequences of alternative legal
alimony rules on partners’ decisions in the second period. Since the
law on divorce introduces an explicit monetary transfer in favor of the
custodial parent (m > 0), the individual incentives may change with its
size. For example when m > 0, parent i prefers to leave as long as:
Di ≥M1i ⇔ m ≤
yi − yj
2
−
(
ci −
c
2
)
≡ mˆi (1)
Typically, mˆi is the maximum amount that i accepts to pay to j in case
of divorce (i.e. mˆi is the willingness to pay of i). Similarly, parent j is
better off divorcing rather than staying in marriage as long as6:
Dj ≥M1j =M0j ⇔ m ≥
yi − yj
2
−
( c
2
− cj
)
≡ mˆj (2)
Now, mˆj is the minimum amount that j accepts to receive from i to agree
to divorce (i.e. mˆj is the willingness to accept by j). As a consequence,
any rule of damage associated with a m > 0 satisfying both (1) and
(2) (i.e. satisfying mˆj ≤ m ≤ mˆi) reaches what may be termed an
implicit mutual consent to divorce despite the unilateral divorce law: it
guarantees that both the parents have a mutual advantage in divorcing
(both partners improve their individual welfare when the divorce occurs),
and it is clear that whatever the divorce law (either the "mutual consent"
or the unilateral divorce law), the partners will agree to divorce. But it
can be verified that there cannot exist such a mutual benefit in divorce
unless γ ≡ c − ci − cj > 0, meaning that the second period household’
expenditures must display decreasing returns to scale. On the other
hand, when the second period household’s expenditures entail increasing
returns to scale (i.e. if γ < 0), then mˆj > mˆi and the unilateral divorce
law cannot guarantee a mutual benefit in divorce for each spouse but
5This set is delimited by the willingness to accept by one parent and the willingness
to pay by the other.
6mˆj corresponds to the "expectation damage rule" in Clark (1999) and Bowles
and Garoupa (2003).
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clearly has redistributive consequences7.
TABLE 1 - redistributive consequences of mˆi and mˆj
mˆi mˆj
Dj = M0 + γ M0
Di = M0 M0 + γ
In the rest of the paper, we will consider these two possible rules
of damage {mˆi, mˆj}. Each one reallocates the (second period) returns
to scale of the household expenditures γ ≡ c− ci − cj, entailing specific
redistributive consequences between the parents in the event of a divorce,
as shown in the following table 1:
2.4 the occurrence of divorce in equilibrium
Let us characterize the outcomes at equilibrium8 in terms of the proba-
bility of divorce in the second period, and in terms of both the parents’
decisions to engage in marriage in the first period. Consider that parent
i is endowed with the rights to divorce. The main result is the following:
Proposition 1 (parent i is endowed with the rights to divorce) Assume
that σ ≡ c− ki− kj < 0. A/ Under the rule m = mˆi, there exists a SPE
where the parents engage in marriage and never divorce in the second
period provided that:
c
2
− kj ≤
yi − yj
2
≤ ki −
c
2
(3)
and if σ− δ
1+δ
γ < 0, there exists a second SPE, where the parents engage
in marriage and divorce with probability 1 in the second period provided
that:
c
2
− kj −
δ
1 + δ
γ ≤
yi − yj
2
≤ ki −
c
2
(4)
7Under a mutual consent divorce law, spouses would be unable to reach mutual
consent, unless we enlarge the set of possible agreements to the case where m < 0 is
possible. See also Fella, Manzini and Mariotti (2004).
8We use the concept of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE hereafter). Note that
it would be more rigorous to characterize the various equilibria in term of parents’
strategies and associated pay-offs. However the discussion is easier the way we pro-
ceed, w.l.o.g.
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B/ Under the rule m = mˆj, if γ < 0 there exists a SPE where
the parents engage in marriage and never divorce in the second period
provided that (3) holds; but if γ > 0 there exists a SPE where the parents
engage in marriage and divorce with probability 1 in the second period
provided that:
c
2
− kj ≤
yi − yj
2
≤ ki −
c
2
+
δ
1 + δ
γ (5)
holds.
C/ When the divorce occurs under the rule m = mˆi, it may result
(i.e. when γ < 0) in a loss of welfare for parent j as compared to if the
parents were married for two periods. In contrast, it is always Pareto
improving under the rule m = mˆj.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix for A/ and B/. C/ i) Under
the rule m = mˆi, partner i is indifferent between divorcing and staying
married. But in case of divorce, we have for parent j that: Dj =M1j +
γ ≶ M1j depending on the sign of γ. Hence, the result. ii) In contrast,
under the rule m = mˆj the divorce cannot occur unless γ > 0, in which
case Dj =M1j and Di =M1i + γ > M1i.
Let us begin with the multiplicity of equilibria in part A/; it is based
on a simple (equilibrium) argument: two different equilibria may exist,
one with a 0 probability of divorce, the second with a probability 1, be-
cause the partner having the rights on marriage dissolution is indifferent
between both outcomes under the rule m = mˆi. In contrast in part B/,
there is a unique equilibrium, since the best decision for parent i depends
on γ ≷ 0.
Note that it is assumed that c− ki − kj ≡ σ < 0 meaning that there
exist increasing returns to scale on first period household expenditures.
The reason is that (see the proof of the proposition) when σ > 0 the
marriage cannot exist at equilibrium in the first period, whatever the
choice of the rule m. Thus, it is natural to focus on the more sensible
case associated with σ < 0.
Coming to the role of the sign of γ, note that when γ < 0 (there
exist increasing returns to scale in the marriage in the second period)
and parent i holds the rights on marriage dissolution, his best (selfish)
decision depends on the setting of the damage rule. The clue to the
story is whether the damage rule forces him to internalize the externality
(scale economies or diseconomies) of divorce or not. Under the rule mˆi,
partner i is perfectly hedged (not penalized), while under the rule mˆj,
he is implicitly rewarded for taking the best decision for the household.
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Finally let us interpret the conditions (3), (4) and (5) supporting the
different equilibria. Notice that they are expressed in a similar way in
terms of both an upper boundary and a lower boundary for yi − yj the
gap existing between the parents’ earnings, as supporting the equilibria
involved. Consider more specifically condition (3): it shows that a basic
motivation for marriage formation (with a 0 risk of divorce) is existing
differences between the partners’ personal income yi − yj (when yi = yj
the marriage is contracted only if c
2
< min (kj , ki); let us maintain this
assumption thereafter). However, this difference between incomes gives
adverse incentives to each partner9: the larger yi− yj, the more likely is
that parent j enters in marriage, but the less likely that parent i does
so. Thus the main prediction is that as the income inequality between
men and women decreases, the easier it is for men to enter into marriage
and in contrast the harder it is for women to accept a marriage.
When the divorce occurs in the future, an additional restriction is
put on one or the other potential partners according to (4) and (5).
In (4) now, the reason why partner j accepts the marriage in the first
period despite the certainty of divorcing is given by the LHS: the gap
between the parents’ incomes must be large enough, i.e. larger than a
threshold
(
c
2
− kj
)
− δ
1+δ
γ which depends on γ the externality created
by the divorce as compared to (3); if γ > 0, then a
yi−yj
2
> 0 is sufficient
for j, while if γ < 0,
yi−yj
2
must be large enough for j to accept the
marriage. Parent i incentives are not changed compared to (3) since in
case of divorce, his welfare is not affected.
The case appearing in (5) is not exactly symmetric to the previous
one, despite the fact that parent j incentives have not been changed
as compared to (3) (in case of divorce, she keeps the same satisfaction
level). The difference is that it becomes easier for i to enter into marriage
when he expects the divorce to occur compared to the RHS in (3), since
he decides to divorce only when γ > 0 and holds up the external benefit
of the divorce.
Before suggesting some more general conclusions, let us have a look
at dual allocation of the rights on divorce. The reader may verify that
should the full rights to divorce be held by parent j, we obtain10:
Proposition 2 (parent j is endowed with the rights to divorce) Assume
that σ < 0. A/ Under the rule m = mˆj, there exists a SPE where the
9Obviously, in our model i and j are perfectly substitutable. But statistically, it
is more likely to be observed that yi > yj when i is "he" and j is "she". We do not
claim to explain why. See section 4.
10In this case, we also assume that the order of play of parents is reversed in period
2.
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parents engage in marriage and never divorce in the second period if (3)
holds, and there also exists a second SPE where the parents engage in
marriage and divorce with probability 1 in the second period if σ− δ
1+δ
γ <
0 provided that (5) holds.
B/ Under the rule m = mˆi, if γ < 0 there exists a SPE where
the parents engage in marriage and never divorce in the second period
provided that (3) holds; but if γ > 0 there exists a SPE where the parents
engage in marriage and divorce with probability 1 in the second period
provided that (4) holds.
C/ When the divorce occurs under the rule m = mˆj, it may result
(i.e. when γ < 0) in a loss of welfare for parent i as compared to if the
parents were married for two periods. In contrast, it is always Pareto
improving under the rule m = mˆi.
Proposition 2 is obviously the dual of proposition 1.
The first major implication of propositions 1 and 2 is that a unilat-
eral divorce law does not necessarily imply inefficient divorces. It can
be seen that the welfare consequences of divorce depend on the way the
rights on marriage dissolution are allocated, together with the setting of
the damage rule. Specifically, allowing partner i to decide on the divorce
and setting the rule mˆi, or alternatively allowing partner j to decide on
the divorce and setting the rule mˆj, are the two cases which may result
in an inefficient divorce. This is because in each situation, the partner
endowed with the rights to divorce is also made indifferent (as a result
of the damage rule chosen) between the divorce and the marriage, and
thus he/she is not penalized when he/she takes the inefficient decision
for the household as a whole (that is, ignoring the existence of returns to
scale in the marriage). In contrast, allowing partner i to decide on the
divorce and setting the rule mˆj, or symmetrically allowing partner j to
decide on the divorce and setting the rule mˆi, lead to situations that will
always result in an efficient divorce: this is because the partner receiv-
ing the exclusive rights on marriage dissolution is implicitly penalized
(rewarded) should he/she take the worst (respectively best) decision for
the household. Our results are consistent with those of Clark (1990) and
Bowles and Garoupa (2003).
The second major implication of proposition 1 and 2 is that they
challenge the prediction of Mechoulan (2005,2006) that unilateral di-
vorce law matters for marriage formation because of the allocation of
rights on marriage dissolution. Our findings show the role of property
division law more than property rights, for the initial decision to enter
into marriage, since property division law provides each partner with
different incentives to enter into marriage.
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The general predictions are as follows: assume a random technology
of matching candidates to a marriage, yielding a random distribution of
yi − yj; then:
Proposition 3 For a given allocation of the rights on marriage disso-
lution:
1) whenever it is associated with a damage rule guaranteeing full
recovery for the other partner, the unilateral divorce law induces only
efficient divorces, and may yield more marriages in period 1.
2) when it is associated with a damage rule with imperfect recovery
for the other partner, too many marriages may be contracted in period
1 which are dissolved in period 2 with probability 1.
3) lower costs of proceedings may result in more marriages in period
1 under m = mˆi, while it entails fewer marriages under m = mˆj.
1) and 2) come from the previous discussion. 1) is the case where
the partner holding the rights internalizes the external benefit of a di-
vorce. 2) is the situation where the external cost of divorce is borne
by the partner not having the rights on marriage. 3) is a by-product:
since we implicitly assume that the costs of proceedings (legal expendi-
tures and time spent) in case of divorce are comprised in ci, cj, they are
included in γ ≡ c − ci − cj. Thus, these costs are reallocated through
the compensation rule. Under m = mˆi as the costs ci, cj decrease, then
also γ decreases and, according to the LHS in (4): fewer marriages are
contracted when γ > 0, but more marriages occur when γ < 0. Under
m = mˆj fewer marriages are contracted according to the RHS in (5)
when γ > 0 decreases.
This section tackled the cases of pure selfish partners even when there
are children involved in the divorce. Now let us see the consequences of
an explicit regulation in favour of the children.
3 parents’ altruism and child well-being
We return to the case where the law on divorce disentangles protective
measures in favor of children from those benefiting to guardian parent.
The USA, Canada and some European countries today have explicitly
adopted scales of alimony for child support in order to help Courts in
their judgment regarding the assessment of the cost of a child. In France,
these guidelines are in debate11. In this section, we focus on the con-
sequence of such guidelines. Two different monetary transfers are thus
11See Bourreau-Dubois, Deffains and Jeandidier (2005) for an application to the
French case. Jeandidier (2003) shows that implicite guidelines are likely to be used by
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considered in the following analysis: one is paid by the leaving parent
to the other one, and the second is supposed to be directly paid to the
children12.
3.1 assumptions
We still consider the timing of decisions corresponding to figure 1, but
we introduce the following modifications regarding the payoffs associated
with the decisions of the parents. At date 0, when individuals engage in
a cooperative marriage, their final utility also depends on the satisfaction
level of their children Mc > 0, up to their individual specific index of
altruism denoted respectively αi > 0 for parent i, and αj > 0 for parent
j. Thus, we have:
M0i =
yi + yj − c
2
+ αiMc ; M0j =
yi + yj − c
2
+ αjMc ; M0c = c+ u
Basically, this assumption implies that the children’s welfare depends
both on the consumption level they reach and u > 0 a pure psychological
consequence representing their feelings of well being and happiness when
they live with their two the parents (expressed through its monetary
equivalent value).
At date 1 now, we assume as before that the second period utilities
of the parents associated to the marriage are respectively defined by:
M1i =M0i ; M1j =M0j ; M1c =M0c
In this context, the unilateral divorce law is associated to a combination
of two rules of damages {m,mc} where the payment of the leaving parent
to the other one is denoted m, and the legal alimony directly paid to the
children is mc. Thus, according to our specification, the dissolution of
the marriage would imply the following respective individual satisfaction
levels for the separating partners and children:
Di = yi −m−mc − ci + αiDc; Dj = yj +m− cj + αjDc ; Dc = mc + v
where Dc > 0 is the utility level of children when divorce occurs, with
v ≤ u the psychological penalty inflicted on children in case of divorce
French Courts, since there is a great homogeneity in decisions between judges belong-
ing to the same Courts, in the area of child’s supports. See Deffains and Langlais
(2005) for an analysis of the influence of guidelines on parents’ choice between a
conflictual and a consensual divorce.
12Bowles and Garoupa (2003) note that despite the fact that this scheme may be
complex to implement, for administrative and practical reasons, it may be seen as
an "ideal system".
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(all else being equal, children are less happy when their parents get
divorced than when they all live together). Once more, note that this is
a matter of debate, since children may feel better off in case of divorce
as compared with if/when the parents were engaged in a conflictual/non
cooperative marriage. Note however that this has no consequence on
our results, i.e. for equilibria emerging.
Regarding the protective measures in favour of children, it may be
postulated that they have to be fully compensated, because they were
not party to the original agreement between the parents when they en-
gaged in marriage, but now, all else being equal, they experience a prej-
udice when the parents decide to divorce. Thus, the damage rule that
may be implemented satisfies:
Mc = Dc ⇔ mc ≡ c+ u− v
On the other hand, the law (the judge) may be more restrictive (or
less protective), and only aims to maintain the consumption level of
children which implies:
m˜c ≡ c⇒Mc > Dc
Clearly, while in the first case the law implies no unfavorable redistribu-
tive consequences for children in case of divorce, in contrast, the welfare
of children decreases when the parents separate in the second one.
To keep things simple, we introduce a damage rule in favour of the
parent who obtains custody of the children such that she receives the
same utility level in the second period whatever the decision of parent
i, hence:
Dj =M1j ⇔ mj =
yi − yj
2
−
( c
2
− cj
)
+ αj(c+ u− v −mc)
which depends on the choice of the other rule mc.
Finally, when the rule of damage in favour of the parent who obtains
the custody of children is such that the leaving parent receives the same
utility level in second period whatever his decision, we have:
Di =M1i ⇔ mi =
yi − yj
2
−
(
ci −
c
2
)
−mc − αi(c+ u− v −mc)
Thus, we may consider four rules of damage in case of a unilateral divorce
law:
- favorable to the guardian parent and children: (mj =
yi−yj
2
−(
c
2
− cj
)
,mc = c+ u− v)
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- favorable only to the guardian parent: (m˜j =
yi−yj
2
−
(
c
2
− cj
)
+
αj(u− v), m˜c = c)
- favorable to the leaving parent and children: (mi =
yi−yj
2
−
(
ci −
c
2
)
−
(c+ u− v),mc = c+ u− v)
- favorable only to the leaving parent: (m˜i =
yi−yj
2
−
(
ci −
c
2
)
− c +
αi(v − u), m˜c = c)
TABLE 2 - consequences of protective measures in favour of children
with a damage rule favorable to the guardian parent
(mj ,mc) (m˜j , m˜c)
Di = M1i − (u− v)− (ci + cj) M1i − (αi + αj)(u− v)− (ci + cj)
Dj = M1j M1j
Dc = c+ u c+ v
TABLE 3 - consequences of protective measures in favour of children
with a damage rule favorable to the leaving parent
(mi,mc) (m˜i, m˜c)
Di = M1i M1i
Dj = M1j − (u− v)− (ci + cj) M1j − (αi + αj)(u− v)− (ci + cj)
Dc = c+ u c+ v
In table 2, we consider two rules of damage which are in favour of
the parent having the child custody: whatever the decision of the other
parent, she keeps a constant utility level. We obtain the opposite result
in the case of the rules of table 3.
3.2 equilibrium with children
The next proposition focuses on the case where the parents are altruistic
(αi > 0, αj > 0), and assumes that parent i is endowed with the rights
to divorce. We have:
16
Proposition 4 (parent i is endowed with the rights to divorce) Assume
that σ∗ ≡ σ − (αi + αj)(u + c) ≤ 0. A/ Whatever the rule, there exists
a SPE such that the parents get married in the first period and do not
divorce in the second period, provided that:
c
2
− kj − αj(u+ c) ≤
yi − yj
2
≤ ki −
c
2
+ αi(u+ c) (6)
Under both rules (mj ,mc) and (m˜j, m˜c), this is the unique equilibrium.
B/ Under the rule (mi,mc), if σ
∗ ≤ − δ
1+δ
[(u− v) + (ci + cj)], there
also exists a second SPE such that the parents get married in the first
period and divorce with probability 1 in the second period, provided that:
c
2
−kj−αj(c+u)+
δ
1 + δ
[(u− v) + (ci + cj)] ≤
yi − yj
2
≤ ki−
c
2
+αi(c+u)
(7)
C/ Under the rule (m˜i, m˜c), if σ
∗ ≤ − δ
1+δ
[(αi + αj)(u− v) + (ci + cj)],
there also exists a second SPE where the parents get married in the first
period and divorce with probability 1 in the second period, provided that:
c
2
−kj−αj(c+u)+
δ
1 + δ
[(αi + αj)(u− v) + (ci + cj)] ≤
yi − yj
2
≤ ki−
c
2
+αi(c+u)
(8)
D/ In any equilibrium where the parents divorce in the second period,
the welfare of parent j is smaller than if the parents were married for two
periods.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix for A/ to C/. In D/ the
result is hardly a surprise: table 2 shows that Di < M1i while table
3 shows that Dj < M1j. This means that in the present context, the
unilateral divorce law cannot guarantee a mutual benefit in divorce for
the parents. More generally, the existence of a mutual benefit would
require that either mj ≤ mi or m˜j ≤ m˜i depending of the choice of
mc (i.e. setting mc = c + u − v or c). The first inequality yields c +
u − v < c − ci − cj ⇔ u − v < −ci − cj, while the second one leads
to c + (αi + αj) (u− v) ≤ c − ci − cj ⇔ (αi + αj) (u− v) ≤ −ci − cj:
clearly, both inequalities cannot hold since by assumption u > v. Thus,
the main consequence of the introduction of parents’s altruism is that
either mj > mi or m˜j > m˜i: thus, the mutual benefit to divorce cannot
exist in equilibrium.
The proof in the appendix reveals that assuming now σ > (αi +
αj)(u + c) would imply that whatever the rule, there can not exist an
equilibrium where the parents engage in marriage in the first period.
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Thus, for our purpose it is natural to focus on the alternative case
σ ≤ (αi + αj)(u + c). This means that as a consequence of the par-
ents’ altruism, the existence of increasing returns to scale in first period
expenditures (σ ≤ 0) gives a sufficient condition for the existence of mar-
riage at equilibrium, but this is not a necessary condition. Conversely,
altruism is necessary but not sufficient to engage in marriage, although
the more the parents are altruistic, the more likely they are to engage in
marriage. Put differently: when scales deseconomies exist in marriage,
the parents’ altruism must be large enough to convince two individuals
to enter into a marriage with children. Note also that regarding this
condition, the individual indexes of altruism play a symmetrical role —
though, for example, it does not matter that αi = 0 if αj > 0 is large
enough.
Regarding the role of yi− yj for marriage contracting, the same gen-
eral comment as made before applies, since the adverse incentives on
potential partners exist. Note that condition (6) explicitly introduces
the specific role of the parents’ altruism in the incentives to enter into
marriage at an individual level: the consequence is that altruism enlarges
the range of admissible values for yi − yj as supporting the marriage in
an equilibrium without a divorce. Moreover, the higher both indexes of
altruism, the more likely the marriage all else being equal.
However, a first modification appears through the predictions of part
A/ as compared to the previous section: now when the exclusive rights
to divorce are held by parent i and when this is associated with a transfer
favorable to the other parent (having custody of the children), then the
parents are committed to the marriage for two periods (at least as far
as σ∗ < 0 holds; otherwise, no equilibrium exist). Put differently, parent
i’s rights are ineffective with such a combination.
As before, parts B/ and C/ show that when full recovery of parent j
is not possible and when the rule is thus favorable to the parent i who
has the rights on marriage dissolution, two equilibria may arise: either
the divorce never occurs (as in part A/), or the probability of divorce
is equal to 1. This second kind of equilibrium is more likely to occur
if σ reaches a negative values, below a threshold which depends on the
compensation rule awarded to the children (and thus, which depends in
a complex manner on the various parameters of the model).
A second major modification as compared to the previous section is
that the setting of the specific damage rule has no impact on parent i’s
incentives to enter into marriage here (note that the same RHS holds
in (6), (7) and (8)), and all else being equal, these incentives increase
with both his index of altruism and the children’s first period welfare.
But things are different for parent j (note that the LHS of the same
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conditions is specific). Parent j’s participation constraint is adjusted to
the risk of divorce: it takes into account the children’s loss of welfare and
the higher fixed costs borne by the parents (LHS of (7) or (8)) in case
of divorce - typically, the term [(u− v) + (ci + cj)] corresponds to the
external cost of the divorce, which is borne by parent j as soon as divorce
occurs. In other words, the LHS in (7) and (8) mean that it must be that
the gap between the parents’ earnings is large enough to compensate her
for the loss of welfare incurred at the time of divorce. Put differently, in
order for parent j to accept to enter into a marriage with children only
for one period (i.e. with a maximal risk of divorce in period 1), the loss
of welfare experienced by parent j in case of divorce (i.e. external cost
of divorce) must be small enough to render the acceptance of a marriage
more profitable than the rejection, during her lifetime.
Were the rights to divorce obtained by parent j, we would obtain the
following results (the proof is left to the reader):
Proposition 5 (parent j is endowed with the rights to divorce) Assume
that σ∗ ≡ σ − (αi + αj)(u + c) ≤ 0. A/ Whatever the rule, there exists
a SPE such that the parents get married in the first period and do not
divorce in the second period, provided that (6) holds. Under both rules
(mi,mc) and (m˜i, m˜c), this is the unique equilibrium.
B/ Under the rule (mj,mc), if σ
∗ ≤ − δ
1+δ
[(u− v) + (ci + cj)], there
also exists a second SPE such that the parents get married in the first
period and divorce with probability 1 in the second period, provided that:
c
2
−kj−αj(c+u) ≤
yi − yj
2
≤ ki−
c
2
+αi(c+u)−
δ
1 + δ
[(u− v) + (ci + cj)]
(9)
C/ Under the rule (m˜j , m˜c), if σ
∗ ≤ − δ
1+δ
[(αi + αj)(u− v) + (ci + cj)],
there also exists a second SPE where the parents get married in the first
period and divorce with probability 1 in the second period, provided that:
c
2
−kj−αj(c+u) ≤
yi − yj
2
≤ ki−
c
2
+αi(c+u)−
δ
1 + δ
[(αi + αj)(u− v) + (ci + cj)]
(10)
D/ In any SPE where the divorce occurs, parent i experiences a loss
of welfare as compared to if the parents were married for two periods.
Once more, proposition 5 is the dual of proposition 4, and the same
qualitative comments apply, the respective role of both the parents being
reversed. Note more specifically that the specific choice of the damage
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rule has no consequence on the participation constraint of parent j (the
parent endowed with the rights on marriage dissolution: see the LHS in
(9) and (10)), although it does modify the incentives of the other one,
in a more demanding sense for parent i: it appears that the RHS in (9)
or (10) are harsher than in (6). The very reason is that parent i bears
the external cost of divorce. Finally, the main conclusion also holds in
this case, that there is a loss of welfare as soon as the divorce occurs.
Children may be not fully compensated for the external cost of divorce
they have to incur when they no longer have the opportunity to live
with both their parents, but moreover it is not possible that altruistic
the parents obtain mutual benefit in divorcing.
Finally as before, let us assume a random technology of matching
candidates to a marriage, yielding a random distribution of yi − yj; the
general predictions are as follows (straightforward given the previous
discussions):
Proposition 6 For a given allocation of the rights on marriage disso-
lution (whether children obtain or not full compensation):
1) when it is associated with a damage rule guaranteeing full recovery
for the other partner, the unilateral divorce law gives ineffective rights
on marriage dissolution. The unilateral law is de facto a no divorce law.
2) when perfect recovery of the other partner is not possible, inef-
ficient divorces occur in period 2, and marriages are less likely to be
contracted in period 1.
3) lower costs of proceedings implies more marriages in period 1.
1) and 2) come from the previous discussion. Note that 3) is easy
to understand: as the costs ci, cj decrease, so do the LHS in ((7) or (8);
hence the result.
One of the interesting points is that despite the altruism of the par-
ents towards children (not because of their selfishness), their exists an
irreducible conflict of interest between the parents.
4 Discussion and conclusion
Note first that our paper is not intended to represent any specific known
divorce law. There is a great heterogeneity between national legislations
(Mechoulan (2006), Smith (2002)). We also leave for future research the
issue of comparing a liberal divorce law versus a mutual consent law in
a dynamic set up.
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We focus on a case with exclusive rights to divorce, and consider
that the monetary transfer associated with property division in case of
divorce is set by the Courts considering the feasible set of transfers of
a mutual consent divorce law. Our main objective was to provide an
analysis of the short run effects and feedback consequences of a divorce
law based on the disconnection between the allocation of the rights to
divorce and the setting of the rule of alimony or damage awards.
The main force driving the analysis is that when household consump-
tion has a large joint component, then the divorce creates an externality
which may be positive or negative. The design of the property law will
have the major effect of reallocating this externality between the par-
ents. A limitation of our analysis is that we do not provide an endogenous
explanation of the source of this externality: it may come from fixed ex-
penditures (housing and complement goods, and so on), taxation or the
direct costs of divorce proceedings. We leave these considerations aside
for future research. Nevertheless, several interesting findings appear in
this set up.
Our simple framework shows that the unilateral law has two kinds of
selection effects, one on divorces, and the second on marriages. But we
have shown that this is less the result of the allocation of the rights on
marriage dissolution, than of the property division rule which allows re-
allocation of the externality of divorce. Moreover, since the costs of the
divorce proceedings may also be reallocated through the rule of compen-
sation, a decrease in such cost does not always yields fewer marriages;
on the contrary, when children and parent’s altruism are explicitly in-
troduced, a decrease in the costs of divorce proceedings induces more
marriages. Introducing the issue of children leads to another conclusion
which is that, apart from the litigious issue of child custody (which is
not addressed here), the parents’ altruism is the source of a irreducible
conflict of interest between the parents in the allocation of the divorce
surplus. We identify rules of compensation for the custodial the parents
which de facto make ineffective the rights on marriage dissolution, and
rules which allow divorce but yield a loss of welfare for the parent who
does not hold the rights on marriage dissolution. A conclusion is that
given the generalization of guidelines use for the setting of spouses’ re-
covery and child support, it must be remembered that they may have
consequences on the rate of divorce, on the allocation of rents between
the parents and finally on the rate of marriage contracting.
We believe that this adds to the literature since formal discussions
have been more focused on the short run consequences of divorce laws
than on long run ones. In the beckerian tradition, Brinig and Crafton
(1994) and Grossbard-Shechtman (1996) have argued that although it
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is not absurd to believe that changes in divorce law may have transi-
tory consequences on the rate of divorce, it is more doubtful that those
impacts prove to be persistent in the long run. The rationale is that
a liberal legislation on divorce will increase the incentives for oppor-
tunistic behaviors, leading to a decrease in the gains from marriage, and
finally discouraging marriage. For Mechoulan (2006), the scenario cor-
responding to the "marriage selection" hypothesis seems to fit well with
the specific pattern of behavior of the divorce rate in the United-States
and it seems to be a consistent explanation for both i) the apparent
convergence in divorce rates between states which have passed no-fault
legislation and those which have not over the last two decades, and ii)
the observation that the consequences of unilateral divorce laws van-
ished 20 years after their introduction, with the rate of divorce in the
USA by the 2000s rejoining its 1970s level. Our work shows that things
are not without ambiguity, since as the cost of divorce decreases, there
are different effects on partners’ incentives to enter into marriage, thus
yielding an ambiguous result on the rate of marriages. The exception
is when children are involved: we find that the decrease in the cost of
divorce allows an unambiguous increase in the rate of marriage.
The empirical evidence does not afford a clear-cut conclusion on the
effects of divorce laws, either13. In any case, the long run pattern of
divorce rates in Europe does not resemble that of the USA: it has con-
tinued to increase for three decades and does not display a tendency to
rejoin the 1970s levels (see Smith (2002), and González and Viitanen
(2006)). For some countries such as France it could be explained that
the transition to a true liberal divorce law is not fully accomplished14
13Studies based on cross section data find that the law is neutral (Peters (1982,
1992)), but others considering panel data exhibit a positive correlation between di-
vorce rates and the change from fault to no-fault legislation (Zelder (1993); Friedberg
(1997)), while those using time series data conclude that if rules of legal procedure
have an impact, taken alone the change from fault to no-fault divorce is not impor-
tant (Smith (1997), Ellman and Lohr (1998)). More recently for Portugal, Coelho
and Garoupa (2004) find that the reform in the 70s has had a significant effect on
the divorce rate, but not the changes in the 90s which appear more as a response by
the legislator to the growing divorce rates. González and Viitanen (2006) use a panel
of 18 European countries, and evaluate at 20% the contribution of legal changes in
divorce law to the increase in divorce rates in Europe between 1960 and 2002.
14The main consequence of the last reform in 2005 was to shorten the delays of
proceedings to obtain a divorce, though there still exist four different legal motives
to divorce, ranging from litigious to amicable divorces. In France, the rate of divorce
increased at the beginning of 1970s, although a new legislation passed only in 1975
and was fully applied only in 1976. Since this date, it has increased continuously
after a stabilization between the middle of 1980s and the middle of 1990s. When
the last reform was passed in 2005, the rate of divorces registered a peak, and then
returned to its long term trend the year after (see Prioux (2007)).
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and thus has not yet produced its (mitigating) long run consequences
through the selection of marriages. But when looking naïvely at passed
experience since the 1970s, one observes that the increase in divorce
rates has started before the passage of the new legislations on divorce,
whatever the country (see the United Sates: Mechoulan (2006)); United
Kingdom: Smith (1997,1998), Binner and Dnes (2001)). These observa-
tions seem to strengthen the argument of endogenous changes in divorce
law (Coelho and Garoupa (2004), Mechoulan (2006)), i.e. that the leg-
islation adapts to the the evolution of the needs of society. Two kinds of
changes in social norms are worth mentioning.
Some authors have advocated that the long-run trend in the rate
of divorces and marriages may be better explained by the changes in
the labor markets of industrial countries that have appeared at the end
of the 20th century, and specifically the increase in female labor sup-
ply (Brinig and Nock (2000), Gray (2001), Weiss and Willis (1997)).
Such issues have complex ramifications, since for example there is evi-
dence that the rates of female participation on the labor market have
also been affected by the anticipation of a change in divorce law (Gray
(1998), Parkman (1998))15. Our paper does not consider the influence
of social norms and we assume both exogenous and stationary incomes
for both spouses. But it could be enriched with imperfect information
on future incomes and consideration of envy, self-esteem and/or fairness,
which have great empirical appeal: it has been reported that unemploy-
ment and professional disappointment (no career promotion) are a good
explanation of the occurrence of divorces, not because of the disagree-
ments and conflicts they could induce between spouses, but because of
differences existing between women’s and men’s (dashed) aspirations,
and specifically, enforcement of self-esteem through the professional suc-
cess of their partner (Nock and Brinig (2005), Oswald (2002a,b)). This
issue and the consequences of the decrease in incomes inequalities be-
tween genders, are not captured by the model.
Other authors note that typically most European countries have also
experienced a phenomenon of substitution between the traditional mar-
riage and various forms of quasi-marital life including free cohabitations
and civil unions16, and an increasing number of childbirths outside mar-
15Note that this argument that the improvement in the economic status of women
is a major force at work, is consistent with the fact that the great majority of filers
in divorces are women (Belmokhtar (2000), Brinig and Allen (2000)). There also
exist connections with the fact that major inequalities between genders still exist in
the domestic production of households despite the increase in the female labour sup-
ply (see Anxo, Flood and Kocoglu (2002) for differences existing between industrial
countries).
16By and large, this tendency began in the early 1970s for North Europe and in
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riage (Prioux (2006-2007)). Thus, it would be worth incorporating in
a strategic model the existence of alternative options to marriage with
children, thus apart of the option "staying alone", adding opportunities
such as forming a household without marrying (or delaying marriage)
or without having children, or having a relationship without forming a
household (until more information is obtained on the partner). As far
as I am aware, little has been done at a theoretical level (see Nordblom
(2004)). One difficulty is that the influence of the divorce law should
have to be also investigated in conjunction with the incentives provided
by other forms of legal arrangements such as the taxation system and
fiscal law17.
Another difficulty is the puzzling evidence showing that on the one
hand, the growing number of cohabitations have not been accompanied
by a decrease but an increase in divorce rates; and on the other hand,
there is also a great instability of all forms of alternative unions (Prioux
(2006,2007)), even when childbirth occurs. Thus, from an economic per-
spective, there is a shift in the issue which is twofold: why do European
people seem to display a short-term horizon regarding their decisions of
(quasi) marital life? In which way are legal changes accompanying or
constraining these decisions?
That European people seem to wish to experience several unions over
their lifetime is a stimulating issue to tackle in the realm of a strategic
dynamic framework - and a challenge for public policies.
APPENDIX
Proof of proposition 1: We give the proof rule by rule.
1/ Consider the second period decision of parent i under the rule
m = mˆj; it is direct that, if γ < 0, parent i always prefers to stay
married in the second period and the probability of divorce is 0. Now,
given the certainty to stay married in the second period, parent i en-
gages in marriage in the first one only if: ui(Mi) = (1 + δ)
(yi+yj−c
2
)
≥
ui(NMi) = (1+δ)(yi−ki), while parent j always accepts only if uj(Aj) =
the 1980s in Western Europe, but only recently for Eastern Europe - Ireland, Poland
and Southern Europe are specific cases where marriage is dominant and divorce is
still rare or illegal. In France, the number of PACS (which are civil unions between
partners of the same or opposite sex) has continued to increase since its creation on
15th November 1999; see Prioux (2007).
17Amar and Guérin (2007) and Legendre and Thibault (2007) provide an empirical
analysis of the influence of income taxation on the marriage decision in the French
case. Prioux (2007) reports that the alignment of the tax status for PACS partners
with that of married people has led to a jumped of 51% in the number of PACS.
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(yi+yj−c
2
)
(1 + δ) ≥ (1 + δ)(yj − kj). As a consequence, the parents agree
to engage in marriage now if condition (3) holds, which also requires
σ < 0. On the other hand, if γ > 0 the best second period decision of
parent i is the divorce, and thus given the certainty to divorce in second
period, parent i engages in marriage in the first one only if: ui(Mi) =
(1+δ)
(yi+yj−c
2
)
+δγ ≥ ui(NMi) = (1+δ)(yi−ki), while parent j always
accepts the marriage only if uj(Aj) =
(yi+yj−c
2
)
(1+δ) ≥ (1+δ)(yj−kj).
As a consequence, the parents agree to engage in marriage now if con-
dition (5) holds.
2/ Now, consider the rule m = mˆi. In this case, the sign of γ, par-
ent i is indifferent in the second period between staying in marriage or
divorcing since he obtains M1i in each case. Thus, there are two cases.
i/ When i files for divorce with certainty later on, he prefers to en-
ter into marriage in the first period only if ui(Mi) = (1 + δ)
(yi+yj−c
2
)
≥
ui(NMi) = (1+δ)(yi−ki), while parent j always accepts only if uj(Aj) =(yi+yj−c
2
)
(1 + δ) + δγ ≥ (1 + δ)(yj − kj). Thus, there exists an equilib-
rium under the rule m = mˆi, where the parents engage in marriage and
divorce with probability 1 in the second period provided that condition
(4) applies.
ii/ Conversely, when i does not file in the second period, as it has
been previously shown in 1/, the parents engage in marriage in the first
period only if (3) is satisfied.
Proof of proposition 4: we solve rule by rule:
1/ Consider either the rule (mj =
yi−yj
2
−
(
c
2
− cj
)
,mc = c+ u− v),
or the rule (m˜j =
yi−yj
2
−
(
c
2
− cj
)
+αj(u−v), m˜c = c); then in each case
Di < M1i. Thus, parent i never files the divorce. Given the certainty
of staying married in the second period, the parents will engage in the
first period only if they are both better off this way, that is, if we have
simultaneously: ui(Mi) ≥ ui(NMi) and uj(Aj) ≥ uj(Rj) or respectively:
(1 + δ)
(
yi + yj − c
2
+ αi(c+ u)
)
≥ (1 + δ)(yi − ki)
(1 + δ)
(
yi + yj − c
2
+ αj(c+ u)
)
≥ (1 + δ)(yj − kj)
meaning that condition (6) must hold. But (6) requires that:
σ ≤ (αi + αj)(u+ c) (11)
Thus, if (17) is satisfied, the unique SPE is such that the parents enter
into marriage for two periods provided that (6) holds.
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2/ Consider the rule (mi =
yi−yj
2
−
(
ci −
c
2
)
− (c + u − v),mc =
c + u − v). By construction, parent i is indifferent between filing the
divorce or staying married. Hence there are two cases. Considering first
the case where i does not file, we are back to part 1/ (thus, the same
equilibrium arises under the required conditions). On the other hand,
when i files with probability 1 in the second period, the parents will
engage in marriage in the first period only if simultaneously: ui(Mi) ≥
ui(NMi) and uj(Aj) ≥ uj(Rj) or respectively:
(1 + δ)
(
yi + yj − c
2
+ αi(c+ u)
)
≥ (1 + δ)(yi − ki)
(1+δ)
(
yi + yj − c
2
+ αj(c+ u)
)
+δ (v − u)−δ(ci+cj) ≥ (1+δ)(yj−kj)
hence the condition (7), which requires that:
σ ≤ (αi + αj)(u+ c)−
δ
1 + δ
[(u− v) + (ci + cj)] (12)
Finally, if (18) holds, there exists a SPE such that the parents get mar-
ried in the first period and divorce with probability 1 in the second
period. Note that the RHS in condition (18) is smaller than the RHS
in condition (17). In the opposite case where σ > (αi + αj)(u + c) −
δ
1+δ
[(u− v) + (ci + cj)] , the unique possible SPE is such that the par-
ents never enter in marriage in the first period.
3/ Consider the rule (m˜i =
yi−yj
2
−
(
ci −
c
2
)
− c+αi(v− u), m˜c = c),
there are also two cases. Either parent i never files and we are back to
part 1/. Or, i files with probability 1, and now the parents engage in
marriage in the first period iff: ui(Mi) ≥ ui(NMi) and uj(Aj) ≥ uj(Rj)
or respectively:
(1 + δ)
(
yi + yj − c
2
+ αi(c+ u)
)
≥ (1 + δ)(yi − ki)
(1+δ)
(
yi + yj − c
2
+ αj(c+ u)
)
+δ(αi+αj)(v−u)−δ(ci+cj) ≥ (1+δ)(yj−kj)
hence the condition (8), which now requires that:
γ ≤ (αi + αj)
[
(u+ c)−
δ
1 + δ
(u− v)
]
−
δ
1 + δ
(ci + cj) (13)
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Finally, if (19) holds, there is a SPE where the parents get married
in the first period and divorce with probability 1 in the second period.
Remark that the RHS in condition (19) is once more smaller than the
RHS in condition (18). But if σ > (αi + αj)(u + c)−
δ
1+δ
(αi + αj)(u −
v)− δ
1+δ
(ci+ cj), the unique SPE is such that the parents never enter in
marriage in the first period.
Thus putting the pieces together leads to proposition 4.
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